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Abstract 
This article builds upon recent scholarship in critical peace studies that focuses on the 
role of civil society actors in formal peacemaking processes, in short, peace talks, and 
post-conflict peacebuilding. The article specifically explores the role of civil society 
actors in the Guatemalan peace process. The research addresses the possible tensions 
and potential complementarities in processes where civil society enjoys a mandated 
role in centralised, formal peace negotiations carried out between the state and armed 
actors in talks levied within the liberal peace framework. In the case of Guatemala, 
non-state actors participated to an unprecedented extent in the peace negotiations, and 
Guatemala has not relapsed into armed conflict. However, post-conflict Guatemala is 
a violent and unstable country. Consequently, the study challenges the assumption 
that peacemaking is necessarily more successful in those instances where provisions 
have been established to guarantee the participation of civil society. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the last decades, and in particular in the aftermath of the 1992 United Nations 
Agenda for Peace, the participation of civil society actors in peacemaking 
(negotiations) and peacebuilding processes has increased considerably (Paffenholz 
2014; Vogel 2016), in parallel with the consolidation of the liberal peace paradigm.i 
During this time, there has been an accompanying increase in scholarship addressing 
the role of civil society in peacebuilding (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008; Paffenholz 
2014; Vogel 2016). The current article builds upon this research, exploring the role of 
civil society in peacemaking in the context of Guatemala, and addressing the complex 
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factors shaping processes where civil society enjoys a mandated role in centralised, 
formal peace negotiations. The term civil society used in this research refers to the 
space of interaction between individual and collective subjects and the state. In 
particular, civil society is defined as the non-state arena which is inhabited by 
voluntarily organised bodies, interest groups and organisations. Said sphere is often 
subject to regulation by the market and is privately controlled. Civil society is distinct 
from the security forces (military and police) and juridical and administrative state 
institutions (Bobbio 1989: 22; Ehrenberg 1999: 144; Keane 1988a: 1). Moreover, in 
this research, a focus is placed upon progressive civil society actors, usually victims 
or social movement actors that emerge out of the sphere of civil society in support of 
peace negotiations. In certain cases, such as that of Guatemala, these actors have 
participated in formal mechanisms linked to peace negotiations. 
 
Whilst acknowledging the central premise of much of the scholarship that civil 
society participation in negotiations is central to sustainable peace, the research 
presented here adopts a critical perspective in this regard. Ending in 1996, 
Guatemala’s peace process, which brought an end to thirty-six years of armed conflict 
(1960-1996), was characterised by the formal participation of eighty-two civil society 
organisations, mandated to send non-binding proposals to the negotiating parties 
through the so-called Civil Society Assembly (ASC), established in 1994. Through 
the ASC, civil society actors participated to an unprecedented extent in the peace 
negotiations, ultimately shaping the content of key specific peace accords.  
 
The peace process was successful, and, since 1996, Guatemala has not relapsed into 
armed conflict, unlike other countries elsewhere in the aftermath of negotiations (Call  
2012). However, despite the focused input from the ASC, negotiations failed to 
address the embedded causes of the armed conflict. The weakness of the peace 
accords in this regard has been a central factor shaping the country’s fragile post-
conflict peace (Briscoe and Rodríguez Pellecer 2010). Since 1996, levels of homicide 
and violence in Guatemala have, in fact, escalated, and the country remains acutely 
unstable, experiencing growing indices of exclusion and poverty in rural areas. At the 
same time, with certain exceptions such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office, state 
institutions, including the judiciary, have been held hostage by elite interests and 
illegal apparatus, neutering their functioning (Brett 2016).  
 
Within this context, the question framing this research is that, if indeed effective civil 
society participation represents a factor central to sustainable peace, what explains 
Guatemala’s profoundly violent and unstable post-conflict peace?  
 
The Guatemala case illustrates the degree to which the participation of civil society 
actors in peace negotiations may, in fact, be neither decisive nor adequate as a 
mechanism through which to establish the parameters to guarantee a more sustainable 
post-conflict peace. Above and beyond civil society participation, what is required is 
the establishment of effective mechanisms through which to assure meaningful 
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engagement with the causes of armed conflict and political violence. If peace is to 
endure, peace accords must provide means through which to engage effectively 
with the causes of armed conflict. 
 
However, this research argues that the inclusion of civil society within peace 
negotiations represents the most likely mechanism through which to achieve a broader 
and more inclusive peace settlement. If negotiations are left to armed actors alone – 
the state and illegal armed groups – the content of the peace accord will ultimately be 
restricted, excluding broader issues such as the causes of the violence, and focusing 
on a more limited set of provisions such as DDR and limited transitional justice 
mechanisms, such as amnesties and truth commissions. The participation of 
progressive civil society actors in peace negotiations is then a necessary condition 
through which to strengthen the possibility for an inclusive peace settlement that 
addresses those issues necessary for a stable post-conflict scenario.  
 
Research presented here draws on archival work carried out in the United Kingdom 
(1996-1997; 1999-2002) and interviews with civil society, government and 
international actors in Guatemala between 1997 and 2002, some of which represented 
data for a Ph.D. in Political Science (University of London, 2002). The research also 
draws upon the author’s own experience working with Guatemalan civil society and 
international organisations within the context of post-conflict reconstruction. Between 
2002 and 2008, the author worked with the Centre for Human Rights Legal Action in 
Guatemala, on legal cases relating to human rights violations committed during the 
armed conflict, and with the United Nations Development Programme and Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as with the 
Norwegian Embassy.  
 
The article is divided into three sections. First, a brief section explores the contextual 
parameters for the research. Second, the discussion turns to the Guatemala case study, 
analysing the peace process, and focusing upon one of its driving dynamics – the 
tensions and complementarities between the peace negotiations and the role and 
impact of civil society actors therein. Finally, the article closes with a series of 
conclusions. 
 
Framing the Research: Theoretical Considerations 
 
Recent peace studies scholarship has sought to move beyond the state-centric vision 
of liberal peace politics in order to focus on the role of unarmed non-state actors in 
transforming violence and building peace (Chandler 2000; Richmond 2005; Mac 
Ginty 2010, 2011; Ramsbotham et al. 2011; Vogel 2016). From this perspective, 
power does not reside exclusively within the state, its actors and its institutions, nor 
should we defer to the state as the hegemonic force in the construction and exercise of 
the social relations of power and peacebuilding. Scholars such as Richmond (2005), 
have further argued that legitimacy is not the sole preserve or privilege of the state, to 
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be imposed from the top down, as is the undergirding premise of the liberal peace 
paradigm. On the contrary, if civil society actors, particularly victims of conflict-
related violence, are excluded from the design and subsequent implementation of 
peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives, these are unlikely to be 
perceived of as legitimate and sustainable in conflict-affected countries (Mac Ginty 
2010, 2012; Brett 2013). Meaningful participation, the argument goes, is more likely 
to foster ownership of effective peacemaking and peacebuilding processes and 
generate a durable post-conflict peace. However, an inclusive peace settlement on its 
own is unlikely to lead to a sustainable post-conflict scenario.  
 
Instead,  two interrelated factors in particular play a key role in establishing the 
conditions for a more sustainable peace: a peace settlement that deals effectively with 
the structural causes of conflict, and the participation of civil society, in particular 
victims, in negotiations. Without the latter, the former is unlikely to take place, given 
that negotiations will lack ownership and be unlikely to address broad issues, 
including the causal factors of armed conflict (Lederach 1997; Van Tongeren 2013). 
As Odendaal (2010) has argued, the involvement of civil society actors in 
peacemaking and peacebuilding may enhance the legitimacy of said processes, 
potentially redressing the ‘legitimacy vacuna’ of orthodox liberal peace interventions 
(Roberts 2011).ii For Odendaal (2010), non-state actors possess the potential to 
propose alternative perspectives and agendas that will tend to be broader and more 
representative than the peace agenda adopted by the parties to negotiation. While civil 
society inclusion is unlikely to reduce polarisation in conflict scenarios, the inclusion 
of a wide spectrum of religious, gender, cultural, business and political 
representatives and labour movements will likely broaden the debate over which 
aspects of the peace agenda should be prioritised. This is the case, Odendaal argues, 
because non-state actors hold ‘a stake in securing a meaningful and just peace’ (2010: 
20).  
 
Negotiations between armed actors alone tend to exclude meaningful engagement 
with the causes of conflict, given that civil society actors have tended to push for 
engagement with a broader set of issues. Significantly, in the absence of engagement 
with the causes of conflict, sustainable peace is unlikely, even if civil society 
participates in the negotiations. Thus, even in those cases where non-state actors 
participate actively in peacemaking, such as Guatemala, what will ultimately be 
determinant are the provisions of the peace accords as regards engagement with the 
fundamental structural causes of armed conflict. However, civil society actors are 
important because, without their participation and the pressure they wield upon the 
negotiating parties, peace accords are likely to exclude broader issues. 
 
Civil Resistance and Critical Peace Studies 
 
The research presented here builds upon peace studies scholarship, whilst at the same 
time acknowledging the insight of recent innovative literature emerging out of the 
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discipline of civil resistance studies, two disciplines that rarely enter into dialogue 
with each other. For example, in their important book Why Civil Resistance Works, 
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) make a significant contribution toward understanding 
the broader implications and impact of the role of non-violent non-state actors relative 
to the impact of armed resistance. The authors argue that transitions precipitated by 
successful non-violent civil resistance campaigns ‘create much more durable and 
internally peaceful democracies than transitions provoked by violent insurgencies… 
nonviolent resistance campaigns are… more likely to establish democratic regimes 
with a lower probability of relapse into civil war” (2011: 10). In this regard, the 
authors argue that the role of civil society actors in shaping successful transitions is 
decisive. Non-violent civil resistance from this perspective stands more chance of 
imbuing the subsequent political regime with legitimacy and resilience in the face of 
challenge and contestation than does the action of violent actors. 
 
The distinctiveness in the focus of these two sets of scholarship is significant. Critical 
peace studies scholarship engages with, amongst other themes, the role of non-violent 
non-state actors, social movements, including victims, in making and building peace – 
including particularly at the local level – and the nature of the peace that may emerge 
as a consequence of such inclusionary dynamics (Mac Ginty 2011; Roberts 2011). 
Scholars juxtapose and contrast bottom-up dynamics to the state-led dynamics 
imposed through the liberal peace, a fragile, top-heavy peace allegedly imposed from 
above by elite actors, often with the determinant support of external international 
actors (Mac Ginty 2010, 2011). In contrast, civil resistance scholars investigate the 
impact of political mobilisations wielded by non-violent actors upon political 
transition, and the nature of the political regime that accordingly ensues. What is 
significant for the framework of this article is that, in part, both sets of scholarship 
seek to revise how power is contemplated and articulated. Critical peace studies and 
civil resistance scholarship share the perspective that the constitution and exercise of 
power and the generation of legitimacy emanate from non-violent non-state actors, 
and are thus not contingent upon or exclusively determined by the state. Power is 
understood from a non-state centric perspective, as situated within and emerging from 
non-state actors, their behaviour, the norms they generate and their strategies. 
However, the state is never entirely removed from the equation.  
 
Recent Critical Peace Studies scholarship has sought to develop a more nuanced focus 
upon the relationship between civil society and the state. Literature on ‘hybridity’ 
focuses upon the forms through which civil society actors at the local level engage 
and negotiate with, or seek to appropriate and shape state and internationally-led 
peacebuilding initiatives (Mac Ginty 2011). Social movement and civil resistance 
scholarship, on the other hand, has also retained a focus on the state. For example, key 
scholarship by Keck and Sikkink (1999), on the so called ‘boomerang effect’, 
addressed how, through transnational advocacy networks, non-state actors, including 
human rights organisations, ultimately rely upon third party states to exert pressure on 
their own states. Other social movement scholarship (Brysk 1994) has emphasised 
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how the state continues to represent one of the central targets of social movement 
strategies. In this respect, whilst exploring alternative sites of power, both sets of 
scholarship recognise the complex relationship between the state and civil society 
actors. 
 
At the same time, both literatures posit that the durability and sustainability of post-
conflict institutions and, in general, peace, and the depth and scope of the security 
experienced within the polity will be contingent, in part, upon the prior active 
participation of civil society actors in shaping transition, sculpting peacemaking 
efforts, and defining the terms of the peace agenda/post-conflict settlement. This latter 
insight is of crucial significance given that, as many scholars such Call (2012) have 
demonstrated, post-conflict scenarios have often been systematically fragile, violent 
and unstable, due, amongst other factors, to the weakened and severely compromised 
capacity of the post-conflict state. Winning the peace then has tended to be more 
arduous than winning the war, and post-conflict violence often situates societies in a 
limbo between war and peace (Mac Ginty 2008a),iii an unending transition 
characterised, in the case of Latin America, by the consolidation of the illiberal state, 
as Smith (2005) has termed it. From the perspective of these distinct literatures, the 
embedded participation of non-violent non-state actors in conflict transformation 
processes (be this peacemaking, peacebuilding or political transition), may increase 
the likelihood of a more stable post-conflict scenario and provide important insight 
into the often acute levels of insecurity and violence that characterise post-conflict 
scenarios. However, as this –paper illustrates, such participation is not, in itself, 
enough. 
 
Non-State Actors and Peacebuilding 
 
Peace negotiations framed within the paradigm of the liberal peace have 
conventionally followed the logic of Track One Diplomacy, where the parties to the 
conflict have defined the agenda of the peace talks, sidelining civil society actors 
from decisive, direct participation. Over the last two decades, nevertheless, broader 
changes have taken place within the international system, precipitating the emergence 
of non-state actors within key spheres of power, including within peacemaking and 
peacebuilding, as the Guatemala case evidences (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Vogel 
2016). Specifically, the implementation of the provisions relative to peacemaking and 
peacebuilding contemplated within the UN Agenda for Peace, launched in 1992 
during the Guatemalan peace process, brought changes in UN practices, as 
international institutions and liberal peace heavyweights began to identify civil 
society actors as central to peacemaking and peacebuilding (Vogel 2016). Said 
changes, reinforced by pressure from civil society organisations in conflict-affected 
countries, led to shifts in the dynamics determining peace negotiations on the ground. 
Specifically, in the aftermath of the Agenda for Peace, and, in the case of Latin 
America during and in the wake of the transition from authoritarian rule, civil society 
and victims’ organisations began to emerge as key political actors, demanding 
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inclusion in peacemaking mechanisms, where appropriate, and a role in post-conflict / 
post-authoritarian reconstruction. As a consequence, civil society actors have 
gradually assumed an increasingly visible, yet albeit secondary, role in formal peace 
processes, thus precipitating important changes in the historically exclusionary 
paradigm of Track One Diplomacy. The formal inclusion of civil society actors in 
peacemaking logically challenges the state-centric dynamic of Track One 
Diplomacy, a dynamic determined by the explicit assumption that power is 
located in the state and derived from the barrel of a gun.  
 
In Track One Diplomacy, the legitimacy of the state and of its negotiating partner has 
been imposed from above, won through and enforced by the implicit threat of a hail 
of bullets. However, over the past decade, the evolution of increasingly complex 
multi-level peacemaking and peacebuilding practices (Ramsbotham et al. 2011) has 
increasingly opened up the field to civil society actors, thus, in part, challenging the 
predominance of Track One initiatives. Whilst Brinkerhoff (2007) maintains a state-
centric focus, he is correct in his assertion that peace must be constructed through a 
differentiated process that articulates diverse levels and actors, including both state 
and civil society, and thus has the potential to construct a network of roots that binds 
central state initiatves to conflict-affected regions. For Brinkerhoff, only in this way 
will peace be legitimate and sustainable and lead to ‘viable governance’ (2007: 17). 
Nevertheless, despite such changes, Track One Diplomacy continues to define 
negotiation models; the state and illegal armed groups are unlikely to relinquish 
power easily to those whom they see as illegitimate actors lacking political 
experience, power and economic resources.  
 
Given that the state remains the key provider of goods and, arguably, the central actor 
within the international system with the legitimate power to negotiate with an armed 
opposition threatening its integrity, the exclusion of civil society actors from 
negotiations is somewhat justifiable. Non-violent non-state actors are not, of course, 
in a position to grant the demands that illegal armed groups make to the state. In the 
Westphalian system, their power deficiency leaves civil society actors bereft of such 
capacity and leverage; it is, rather, the state that is deemed to possess the power and 
capacity to acquiesce to and enforce the commitments levied by peace negotiations. 
Moreover, as if it were not already sufficiently complicated to broker an agreement 
between armed adversaries whose agendas and demands are likely to be 
contradictory, the participation of non-state actors with broader agendas may defer the 
termination of armed conflict yet further.  
 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of critical peace studies scholarship, and 
increasingly of international actors, those affected by conflict and violence 
should have a central voice in conflict transformation. Given the intractability of 
the Westphalian system and the recalcitrance of states to relinquish their entitlement 
to power, the challenge, however, has become how to design effective mechanisms 
through which to warrant the meaningful inclusion of non-state actors, including at 
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national and local levels. It is to this issue within the case study of Guatemala to 
which the article now turns.  
 
Guatemala: the Limits to Formal Civil Society Participation? 
 
The Violence 
 
Guatemala’s brutal internal armed conflict between state forces and the guerrilla the 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) commenced in 1960 and was 
brought to a formal close in 1996, when peace talks monitored by the United Nations 
Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) ended. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
security forces had orchestrated a systematic assault on civil society organisations as 
part of the counterinsurgency strategy implemented within the framework of the 
National Security Doctrine. Civil society organisations, including unions and peasant 
movements, campaigning against historical levels of exclusion, some, although by no 
means all, of which were directly linked to the guerrilla movement, were 
systematically targeted as the political wing of the insurgency, regardless of their 
links to the rebels. Urban trade unions, teachers’ organisations and human rights 
organisations were ferociously attacked by the military, resulting in systematic 
egregious human rights violations (CEH 1999; Sanford 2003). The rural 
counterinsurgency, which, according to the UN sponsored truth commission, 
culminated in genocide against the Maya in 1983 (CEH 1999; Brett 2016), 
represented a pivotal aspect of military strategy. The state targeted community-based, 
peasant, religious and indigenous organisations, as the military sought to wipe out the 
guerrilla’s social base. According to the country’s truth commission, 83% of the 
victims of the armed conflict were non-combatants (CEH 1999). 
During the first half of the 1980s, Guatemalan non-state actors were driven 
underground; in the midst of the violence, organisations either ceased to operate, or 
did so clandestinely (Green 1998). However, in the wake of the military’s strategic 
victory over the guerrillas in 1984, state-sponsored political violence decreased. 
Consequently, a political space emerged in which civil society began to mobilise. 
Unlike in Argentina and Chile, civil society played no role in the political transition, 
given it was orchestrated by the military and pacted with the economic and political 
elite (O’Donnell and Schmitter 2013). In this respect, Guatemala falls out of the remit 
of the framework proposed by Chenoweth and Stephan, given that the transition was 
orchestrated by the most powerful armed actor (the state). However, with the election 
of civilian president Vinicio Arévalo Cerezo in 1986, the ‘resurrection of civil 
society’, as O’Donnell (1993) has termed it, began.  
Precedents to Participation. 
 
The first organisations that emerged organically after 1984 articulated demands based 
on universal and individual human rights, particularly civil and political 
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rights. Demands focused on the right to life and freedom of association – specifically 
an end to ongoing human rights violations, including forced recruitment into 
paramilitary groups – and the restoration of the rule of law. The organisations that 
emerged were constituted principally by indigenous victims of the conflict, given that 
over 80% of victims had been indigenous (CEH 1999). During this stage, 
organisations did not define their actions as explicitly oriented toward peacemaking or 
peacebuilding, nor focus directly upon economic exclusion. The master frame shaping 
demands was linked directly to fundamental human rights guarantees. A direct link 
between civil society platforms and the peace agenda only emerged once the peace 
process began after 1987 and international involvement was secured (Brett 2008). 
Moreover, with the commencement of the peace process, organisations began to 
broaden their demands, linking them to land reform and the economic causes of the 
conflict. At the same time, movements increasingly engaged with the international 
rights regime, employing the ‘boomerang’ strategy (Keck and Sikkink 1998), linking 
successfully to international organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International. Significantly, these civil society organisations were not ‘internationally-
induced’ as scholars have identified in cases elsewhere (Richmond 2005; Pouligny 
2005; Vogel 2016); on the contrary, they emerged organically as victims established 
movements through which to articulate their demands once massive violations had 
subsided. 
 
Non-State Actors and Peacemaking in Guatemala 
 
With the onset of the regional peace process Esquipulas II, and the first formal 
meeting between the URNG and the government in 1987, non-state actors began to 
frame themselves as part of an incipient peace process. Organisations increasingly 
sought to shape and participate in the emerging peace agenda. As part of the 
commitments enshrined in Esquipulas II, the National Reconciliation Commission 
was established, under whose auspices, two years later, the Grand National Dialogue 
(GND) was called. The GND, which included forty-seven organisations and eighty-
four delegates, set the precedent for civil society participation in the peace process. 
Moreover, the principal themes discussed would subsequently be integral to the peace 
process: DDR, socio-economic issues, human rights and indigenous issues (Jonas 
2000). 
 
Building upon the GND, as a consequence of the demands of civil society actors and 
recommendations of the UN, the Civil Society Assembly (ASC) was established in 
1994 as a consultative body to the negotiations, immediately formalising the role of 
non-violent non-state actors in the peace process. The ASC embodied the reformed 
thinking and shifting norms at the international level, reflecting the recent shift 
towards inclusive mechanisms as contemplated within the UN Agenda for Peace. The 
ASC was constituted by organisations of peasants, women, widows, indigenous 
and human rights activists that had emerged organically in the mid-1980s. The 
Assembly was mandated to send non-binding proposals for the peace accords to the 
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negotiating table, at once providing organisations with an institutional framework 
through which to channel their demands and at once legitimising their claims 
(Krznaric 1999). A broad range of progressive pro-peace organisations participated in 
the ASC, with the exception of ultra-conservative the Agricultural, Commercial, 
Industrial and Financial Coordinating Committee (CACIF). Human rights and 
indigenous organisations eventually came to play a decisive role in the ASC, 
contributing effectively to the formulation of a series of accords, including the 
Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights (1994) and the Agreement on Identity 
and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (AIDPI) (1995). The proposals for the accords sent 
to the negotiating parties by the ASC represented, in general, broad issues linked to 
the causes and consequences of conflict. For example, the content of the final AIDPI, 
which reflected the initial proposal from the ASC, represented a complex and 
sophisticated approach to indigenous affairs that emerged directly out of discussion 
by the indigenous movement and built upon the International Labour Organisation 
Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 
ratified by the Guatemalan government in 1995. 
However, as previously discussed, the causes of the armed conflict – land 
distribution and control, fiscal inequality, rural development, horizontal 
inequalities – were not addressed adequately in the peace accords. Elite economic 
and political actors were intransigent, rejecting any engagement with issues such as 
land reform. Given this intransigence, within this context, pressure from civil society 
around said issues possessed little leverage and was unlikely to have precipitated a 
shift in the perspective of the government or elite actors. Moreover, and significantly, 
the majority of civil society actors assumed a strategic decision not to push for such 
policies through the ASC. When the discussion over the socio-economic accord began 
in 1995, the majority of organisations active in the ASC sent proposals to the 
negotiating parties that focused upon civil, political and cultural rights. Such watered 
down proposals sought to avoid jeopardising the gains organisations had previously 
achieved across the other peace accords, including in the AIDPI. ASC members then 
lowered their profile: demands for land reform (the key cause of the conflict) were all 
but absent from the scenario. Only the National Indigenous and Peasant Coordinator 
(CONIC) maintained its demands for land reform and, when said demands clearly 
achieved neither institutional response nor sympathy from other civil society 
organisations, CONIC intensified its strategy of land occupations. As it did so, all 
other members of the ASC publicly rejected this strategy, defining it as radical, and 
fracturing the previous consensus amongst ASC participants (Brett 2008). 
The participation of non-state actors through the ASC achieved important gains, 
shaping individual agreements, broadening their content and assuring that the 
accords represented civil society demands more closely. At the same time, in an 
albeit secondary capacity, civil society actors became a sparring partner to the state 
and URNG, maintaining the visibility and impetus of the negotiations and pressuring 
the armed actors to adhere, within reason, to their timetabled commitments, reflecting 
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the insight of schoalrs such as Odendaal (2010) and Van Tongeren (2013). In this 
regard, non-state actors partially sustained the peace process and, with the decisive 
support of the international community, made its permanent derailment more difficult. 
For example in 1993, when then President Jorge Serrano attempted a self-coup, both 
civil society and the international community placed effective pressure upon Serrano, 
causing him to back down. 
 
Nevertheless, the ASC was incapable of effectively challenging and pushing back the 
imperatives of the negotiating parties – in particular of the government – as regards 
engagement with the causes of the armed conflict. Civil society participation was thus 
an insufficient condition for establishing meaningful parameters for a sustainable 
post-conflict scenario. This was the case not only because civil society demands were 
subordinated to the more powerful prerogatives of the negotiating parties, but also 
because, within this context, the majority of civil society actors themselves refrained 
from pushing actively for such programmes. Division within civil society actors then 
weakened any possibility of effective collective bargaining. 
 
The Limits to the Impact of Non-State Actors 
 
Despite their elevation to the status of legitimate political actors and formal 
consultants to the negotiations in Guatemala, the weakness of non-state actors in its 
aftermath was immediate and acute. During the peace process, and with the support of 
liberal peace heavyweights, such as the UN and bilateral donors such as Norway, the 
USA and Sweden, civil society actors had assumed an unprecedented visibility and 
asserted a key influence upon national politics, decisively shaping a series of key 
peace accords, no small achievement in the post-conflict context. However, in the 
aftermath of the peace process, military, economic and political elites remained firmly 
at the helm of the ship of state (Kruijt and Koonings 1999). With the end of the armed 
conflict, and in particular during the second half of the government of Alvaro Arzú 
(1996-2000), the capacity of civil society actors to wield leverage over formal policy 
making processes waned as it became increasingly subject to and limited by the 
formal democratic framework. In general, a series of interrelated factors explain this 
process. 
 
The signing of the peace accords evidenced that the political space afforded to non-
state actors during peacemaking and in its immediate aftermath had represented a 
temporary conjuncture, a politics of exception. The framework of the peace process 
and the sustained pressure of liberal peace actors afforded civil society actors with a 
key, although limited space. The peace process had imposed a condition of flexible 
sovereignty upon the Guatemalan state that was immediately derogated once the final 
peace deal had been signed. As the country shifted away from armed conflict, 
congress, political parties and state institutions were restored as the principal arbiters 
of power through which to resolve political conflict and formulate and execute 
national policy; principles central, of course, to the liberal peace paradigm.  
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Whilst political democracy had been restored nominally, it remained schizophrenic, 
hybrid, low-intensity (O’Donnell 1993; Karl 2005). In this respect, formal democratic 
norms and practices (the right to vote, for example), coexisted alongside authoritarian 
enclaves, norms and practices, as formal political channels were dominated by 
unrepresentative, weak and corrupt political parties with little organic relationship to 
the majority population (Torres-Rivas 2007). In this context, non-state actors carried 
out effective forays into party politics – including through the formation of the New 
Guatemalan Democratic Front (FDNG), which won six seats in congress in the 1996 
elections. However, such parties lacked the political experience, popular support and 
clout to operate effectively within the formal political sphere, and were thus unable to 
influence national politics successfully.  
A further factor limiting the impact of non-state actors was their unrepresentative 
nature. Civil society organisations in Guatemala were isolated from, and, in many 
cases contradicted the perspectives and demands of broader society. The 
Guatemalan public, in general, eschewed discussion of the conflict and tended toward 
silence and indifference as the predominant strategic response to past violence. In this 
respect, the ASC, in general, and civil society organisations in particular, reflected the 
interests and values of a limited section of the population. Trans-sectoral, class, and 
ethnic networks then were not consolidated during Guatemala’s peace process, a 
phenomenon that consequently weakened the capacity of non-state actors to wield 
longer-term impact, impeded ownership over the process and restricted the possibility 
for a more sustainable peace. Furthermore, perpetrators and political and economic 
elites had been little convinced by the peace process and had, in reality, undertaken it 
due eminently to international pressure, assuming the language of peace and rights in 
order to guarantee pacification and access to international markets.  
At the same time, liberal peace actors, such as the UN, the Organisation of American 
States and bilateral donors, whilst supporting those fundamental platforms articulated 
by civil society actors that coincided with the liberal peace agenda – such as universal 
human rights, rule of law, electoral participation – gave short shrift to other, locally-
driven demands that represented more closely and spoke to the structural causes of the 
violence. This is not to suggest that Guatemala’s social movements were exclusively 
internationally-induced – they were not. Rather, support was aligned with and sought 
to advance liberal peace objectives. In the aftermath of the peace process, non-state 
actors became increasingly subject to donor agendas, obliged to compete for 
international funds – for example through the UNDP’s flagship Programme for Civil 
Society (PASOC) fund – and forced, albeit tacitly, to drop more radical agendas (such 
platforms supporting as land reform) in favour of alignment with liberal peace 
portfolios emphasising individual and universal civil and political rights over and 
above collective rights. Those that did not were ultimately marginalised from funding 
opportunities. Said processes led to the so-called NGO-isation of social movement 
organisations. As Vogel has evidenced for the case of Cyprus, ‘international support 
steers civil society discourses and fosters the adoption of global agendas... The system 
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prioritises those actors willing to operate within the boundaries of liberal peace 
interventions over those that are not’ (2016: 7). 
Furthermore, in the case of Guatemala, peasant organisations demanding more radical 
solutions to poverty and underdevelopment framed through collective rights to land, 
for example CONIC, had been sidelined from the peace agenda, formulated over time 
by the negotiating parties and corroborated by the UN and other liberal peace actors 
(Brett 2013). Other organisations marginalised their own voices, silencing their 
demands in order to capitulate with the liberal peace agenda relative to poverty 
alleviation and development. For example, the peace accords adopted a neo-liberal 
economic agenda as the key mechanism through which to alleviate poverty, a 
fundamental tenet of the liberal peace paradigm. Land reform was eschewed in favour 
of a World Bank funded land bank through which poor landless peasants were 
encouraged to apply for loans and purchase land. The initiative only exacerbated rural 
poverty yet further: peasant farmers were offered title to land at excessive prices, land 
that was generally in poor conditions and not fertile. Peasant farmers that purchased 
land were subsequently unable to work it effectively. With no state initiative to 
develop rural markets to accompany the land sales, and with low levels of crop 
production, many peasants abandoned their newly bought land, leaving them both 
landless and in debt. In this context, many peasant farmers have been easily persuaded 
to collaborate with illicit actors, such as drug trafficking organisations (DTOs), who 
pay farmers handsome settlements to grow illegal crops and facilitate their trafficking.  
The peace accords also emphasised a focus upon individual political rights – a central 
axis of the liberal peace agenda – to address the political exclusion that had been a 
core cause of the armed conflict. Political parties became a focus of the political 
reform programme at the centre of an international agenda emphasising political 
democracy. However, said initiatives only served to strengthen an already 
exclusionary and unrepresentative political system, whilst sidelining civil society 
actors and their broader demands.  
In this respect, the Guatemala case evidences the limits to the impact of civil society 
participation in peacemaking. The participation of non-state actors in peacemaking 
opened the possibility for a more inclusive peace settlement. The ASC transmitted 
broader demands to the negotiating parties, shaping the accords to include content that 
would have been absent had civil society not participated in the negotiations. 
However, the provisions of the accords and the nature of international support 
undergirding them remained subject to liberal peace logic and eschewed engagement 
with the causes of conflict. Civil society actors were unable to overcome elite 
prerogatives and thus impose an agenda that addressed meaningfully the embedded 
structural causes of violence. Civil society participation then, despite having kept the 
negotiations on track and broadened the peace agenda, was unable to guarantee the 
inclusion of those conditions capable of generating a stable post-conflict scenario. 
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Conclusions  
This paper has argued that in Guatemala, civil society inclusion in peacemaking did 
not lead to sustainable peace and consolidated development. Rather, and as other 
scholars have argued for cases elsewhere, within Guatemala’s liberal peace paradigm, 
civil society actors ultimately supported western and elite peace agendas framed 
through political liberalisation and economic neo-liberalism (Mac Ginty and 
Richmond 2013; Vogel 2016). In the aftermath of negotiations, Guatemala’s post-
conflict polity has become increasingly violent and unstable. The Guatemalan peace 
deal has not collapsed. However, whilst homicide has decreased marginally since 
2011, social and economic violence has escalated since 1996. In this context, human 
rights defenders remain under daily threat, and poverty and economic exclusion in 
some quarters have escalated.iv The participation alone of civil society actors in 
peacemaking failed to establish the parameters for a sustainable post-conflict 
scenario, given the nature of that participation, the overriding prerogatives of elite 
actors and the limited implementation of the peace accords. What might be learned 
from the Guatemala case then? 
 
First, the nature of civil society inclusion in the negotiations was in itself limited. The 
role assigned to the ASC was as a secondary actor: the proposals sent by the assembly 
to the negotiating parties were not binding, but rather of a consultory nature. In this 
context, civil society participation legitimised the negotiations to the international 
community and sections of Guatemalan society and evidenced the political will of the 
government and guerrilla to include the demands of victims. However, the impact of 
the ASC was ultimately decided by the negotiating parties – particularly the 
government – and those whom they represented, whose interests, to a certain degree, 
did not converge those of the organisations that participated in the ASC. The 
economic and political elite acquiesced to those demands that coincided with their 
own perspectives, but would not entertain demands that sought to engage 
meaningfully with the structural causes of conflict. Given such reticence, civil society 
organisations themselves eschewed radical demands that would transform conflict 
drivers. 
 
In this context, the Guatemala case suggests that civil society participation in peace 
negotiations should be afforded a distinct mandate. Civil society organisations, in 
particular victims of armed conflict, should be authorised with a binding mandate: 
demands that are agreed upon through consensual negotiation by civil society actors 
should be binding upon the negotiating parties. In this regard, civil society inclusion 
should move beyond a secondary role: civil society organisations should be given a 
collective voice in peace processes that possesses equal weight to that of conflict 
parties. The input of civil society actors into peace negotiations must bring with it 
fundamental obligations for negotiating parties, a process that would change the 
exclusionary dynamics of Track One Diplomacy and make real the transformative 
potential of Tracks Two and Three. Victims in particular, and civil society actors in 
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general, must assume a parity role in negotiations in order to transform ‘the inherent 
power imbalance between different actors and structural inequalities’ (Vogel 2016: 
21). 
 
A top-down, state-centric comprehension of power, its sources and its exercise is not 
only increasingly morally bereft in the context of peace negotiations, but also 
contributes to the perceived illegitimacy and fleeting durability of post-conflict 
settlements and raises the potential for post-accord violence. In this respect, 
participation should be extended from secondary mechanisms, to include a direct point 
of entry to the negotiating table for civil society actors, a modality that has been used in 
the case of victims of violence in the recent Colombian peace process with the FARC-
EP guerrilla. In this regard, in the case of the current peace talks between the 
government of President Santos and the FARC-EP guerrilla, in 2014, sixty victims (in 
five delegations of twelve individuals) were given a direct seat at the negotiating table 
in order to present their testimonies and proposals for the victims’ accord. Whilst this 
participation remained at the level of consultation, the presence of victims at the 
negotiating table elevated the possibility that their albeit non-binding demands would 
ultimately wield a meaningful impact. The victims delegations imposed the human face 
of suffering upon the negotiating table, gradually transforming the perspectives of the 
parties to negotiation. Said inclusion also broke down the distance between armed 
actors and non-violent civil society actors, precipitating a gradual process of learning 
and opening a path towards mutual recognition (Brett 2016). Consequently, it is 
recommended that civil society actors be afforded a direct role in negotiations and their 
proposals be binding. 
 
The mandated direct inclusion of non-state actors in formal peace processes that 
addresses structural causes of conflict meaningfully and provides binding proposals may 
mitigate some of the inherent problems of liberal peace politics and thus increase the 
possibilities of a secure, stable and sustainable post-conflict. Permitting civil society 
actors to design and edify the conditions of the peace and the parameters of the post-
conflict social contract to which they will be subject will represent a key source of 
legitimacy and sustainability over the post-conflict peace, as local pro-peace agendas of 
progressive non-state actors assume parity with and are not overridden by elite liberal 
peace prerogatives. 
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i The research in this article is aligned with the distinction proposed in the UN Agenda for Peace between 
peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding. In this respect, Peacemaking is here understood as any 
action with the objective of bringing hostile parties to agreement (through those peaceful means foreseen 
in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding is contemplated as any 
‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to 
avoid a relapse into conflict’. See http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm (Accessed June 8 2016). 
 
ii The United Nations has also increasingly argued that the participation of non-state actors in 
peacebuilding plays a critical role in legitimising and transforming said processes (UN 2011: 3). 
iii Scholars differ as to their perspectives regarding the degree to which post-accord violence is, or is not, 
political. Kruijt and Koonings (1999) suggest violence is ‘democratised’ in post-conflict scenarios, and 
thus causes of violence remain diverse, whilst Steenkamp (2014) identifies a clear relationship between 
conflict and post-accord violence. 
iv Between 2011 to 2012, the homicide rate decreased from 38.6 to 39 per 100,000 inhabitants 
(UNODC 2013), This further decreased in 2013 to 34.3 per 100,000 inhabitants. In 2015, there were 
4,778 registered homicides in Guatemala (29.5 per 100,000 inhabitants), a minor decrease from the 
4,998 homicides recorded in 2014.iv According to the US Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security, statistics from the Guatemalan government, reported episodes of sexual assault increased 
from 120 in 2009 to 614 in 2014. Motors of homicide and violence are diverse, and include gang 
presence, the sale and trafficking of illegal drugs, increasing levels of domestic abuse, the weak 
capacity of the security forces and law enforcement institutions, and increased corruption and state 
capture by criminal groups. See http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-homicide-
round-up-2015-latin-america-caribbean and 
https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17785, accessed 7/11/2016. 
                                                 
